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ABSTRACT 
Smart grid is an alternative solution of the conventional power grid 
which harnesses the power of the information technology to save 
the energy and meet today's’ environment requirements. Due to the 
inherent vulnerabilities in the information technology, the smart 
grid is exposed to a wide variety of threats that could be translated 
into cyber-attacks. In this paper, we develop a deep learning-based 
intrusion detection system to defend against cyber-attacks in the 
advanced metering infrastructure network. The proposed machine 
learning approach is trained and tested extensively on an empirical 
industrial dataset which is composed of several attack’ categories 
including the scanning, buffer overflow, and denial of service 
attacks. Then, an experimental comparison in terms of detection 
accuracy is conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
approach with Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine, and Random 
Forest. The obtained results suggest that the proposed approaches 
produce optimal results comparing to the other algorithms. Finally, 
we propose a network architecture to deploy the proposed anomaly-
based intrusion detection system across the Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure network. In addition, we propose a network security 
architecture composed of two types of Intrusion detection system 
types, Host and Network-based, deployed across the Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure network to inspect the traffic and detect the 
malicious one at all the levels. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Smart grid is an alternative of the conventional power system since 
it harnesses the power of the communication and the information 
technology (ICT) in generating, delivering, and consuming the 
energy power. Unlike the traditional power grid, the smart grid 
enables the two-way flow of information which creates an 
automated and widely distributed system that offers new 
functionalities such as operational efficiency, grid resilience, real-
time control, and better integration of the renewable technology. 
However, the inherent weaknesses in the ICT expose the power grid 
to a wide variety of threats that can be exploited it and translated it 
into impactful cyber-attacks. Such cyber-attacks can cause an 
interruption in the power generation causing a disturbance in the 
system stability and a potential socio-economic impact [10].  
Despite the wide variety of industrial cyber-attacks, they usually 
attempt to compromise these three security parameters: 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity [11]. The first class of 
attacks which target the confidentiality includes attacks such as 
Traffic analysis attack [17], Modbus network scanning [2], and 
DNP3 network scanning [7] which target the two industrial 
protocol Modbus and DNP3, respectively. The second category of 
attacks which target the availability of the system includes attack 
such as Puppet attack [25], the Time delay switch attack and the 
Time synchronization attack [27] which are considered as a denial 
of service attack. The third category of attacks includes the false 
data injection attack, popping the Home Machine Interface (HMI) 
[17], Masquerade attack [17], and jamming attack [13].  
Defending against these various cyber-attacks in a distributed and 
heterogeneous system, such as smart grid, is challenging. The smart 
grid consists of several system and protocols including the 
supervisory and control and data acquisition (SCADA), the demand 
response system, the automation substation, and the advanced 
metering infrastructure (AMI). In this paper, we will focus on 
defending against cyber-attacks in the AMI network because it 
constitutes the main connection point between the Home Area 
Network (HAN) with the Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) and 
the Wide Area Network (WAN). The AMI Advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI) is responsible for collecting, measuring and 
analyzing energy, water, and gas usage. It allows two-way 
communication from the user to the utility. It consists of three 
components: smart meter, AMI headend, and the communication 
network. Smart meters are digital meters, consisting of 
microprocessors and a local memory, and they are responsible first 
for monitoring and collecting power usage of home appliances, and 
also for transmitting data in real time to the AMI, which is an AMI 
server consisting of a meter data management system (MDMS). 
The communication between the smart meters, the home 
appliances, and the AMI headend is defined through several 
communication protocols such as Z-wave and Zigbee [9, 10, 12, 
17].  
To protect the AMI network and defend against the malicious 
anomaly, we propose in this paper an intrusion detection system 
(IDS). There are three distinct categories of IDS: specification 
based approach, anomaly-based approach, and signature-based 
approach. The first approach is based on the logical specification 
for identifying deviations from the normal behavior profile. The 
second approach utilizes statistical measures to distinguish between 
normal and anomalous behavior. The third category consists of 
discriminating the malicious behavior from the normal one using a 
database of known attack signatures [3]. The main drawback in 
adopting the specification and logical-based approaches is that they 
require a frequent update of the attacks’ database and the 
specifications’ list. In this paper, we propose an anomaly-based 
intrusion detection system (IDS).  
A well-known criticism of the anomaly based IDS is its high rate 
of false positive and low rate of the accuracy. Therefore, several 
research papers have been published to address these issues and 
improve the IDS performances in the AMI network. For instance, 
the authors of [6] proposed an IDS based on both the anomaly-
based and signature-based approaches. Their proposed IDS is 
divided into two main modules: passive and active modules. The 
passive module is responsible for inspecting the streaming data 
using the specification based approach while the active module is 
utilized the anomaly based approach. Their solution is deployed 
using a single-pass algorithm called FP-Steam. Authors in [20] 
proposed and a sequence mining based IDS approach. In their 
approach, the sequence mining algorithms are utilized to collect the 
network data stream and then a sliding window technique is used 
for detecting the network intrusions. Based on their obtained 
results, the proposed approach report high accuracy rate. In [26], 
authors proposed a distributed IDS for the entire Smart Grid 
network based on two clonal algorithms named AIRS2Parallel and 
CLONALEG, which are derived from the support vector machine 
and the artificial immune system. The proposed IDS architecture is 
deployed in the grid through three main networks: HAN, NAN, and 
WAN. The authors of [21] proposed a signature-based IDS 
approach using the time-table-joined frequent serial episode for 
extracting the signatures from the time-series stream. In [16], 
authors proposed a Fuzzy logic approach for detecting 
automatically the characteristics of clusters, which could be 
anomalous or a normal cluster, from the network data stream. In 
[12], the authors proposed an IDS based on the data stream mining 
approach for the AMI network. In their approach, the authors 
conducted a comparison performance of seven stream data mining 
classifiers based on several metrics including the accuracy, the 
processing time, and the false positive rate.  
In our previous paper, we have conducted a performance 
comparison between several machine learning based IDS 
approaches including Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, and Random 
Forest. To the author’s best knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
propose Deep learning (DL) based approach for the AMI network. 
In this paper, we propose a feasible security network architecture 
to deploy the proposed IDS across the AMI network at the key 
points in order to detect the intrusion at all the levels. The proposed 
DL-based IDS approach is trained and tested extensively on the 
NSL KDD data set which includes different categories of cyber 
attacks where three activation functions are explored: Sigmoid, 
Relu, and Tanh in order to improve detection accuracy.  The 
optimal output is compared against Support Vector Machine, Naïve 
Bayes, and Random Forest. The comparison is based on several 
performance metrics including the probability of detection, the 
probability of false alarm, and the probability of miss detection.  
This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section is 
divided into three subsections. Subsection one describes how the 
proposed IDS architecture can detect the intrusions at the key 
position of the AMI network. The second one explains the DL-
based while the third one describes presents the proposed 
methodology used to preprocess the dataset. The second section 
presents and discuss the obtained results. In the last section, we 
draw some conclusions.  
2. Methodology  
2.1 Proposed IDS for the AMI network 
A typical Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is composed of 
three main components: smart meters, an AMI headend, and 
network communication. A smart meter is a digital meter 
responsible for collecting in real-time the measurement and 
transmit these data to AMI headend. The headend consists of two 
main parts: the AMI server, which is responsible for collecting the 
meter data, and a meter data management system (MDMS), which 
manages collected data and shares it with other systems such as 
demand response systems, historians, billing systems. The 
communication between the smart meters and the AMI headend 
passes through several network protocols including the power line 
communications (PLC), Zigbee, Z-Wave, and the Wireless M-Bus 
[3].  
Since the AMI system is a highly connected network and 
weaknesses in one component exposes the entire system to a wide 
variety of risk. Thus, we proposed an end-to-end security strategy 
with two lines of defense. As shown in Figure. 1, the first line is 
ensured by the Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). The HIDS 
is deployed at smart meters and the AMI backend server and its 
main purpose is to protect the firmware, the operating system and 
the software, and the network interfaces of these devices. There are 
several cyber attacks can target primarily the smart meter devices 
and the AMI backend server including virus, worm, Trojan horse, 
MITM, and DoS attacks. The HIDS defends against those cyber 
attacks by analyzing specific host-based actions, such as the used 
applications, the accessed files, and the data resides in the kernel 
logs.  
The second line of defense consists of the Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS). The AMI network is subject to various 
network attacks including the Replay attack, Jamming channel 
attack, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). The NIDS 
defends against those cyber attacks by sniffing and inspecting the 
AMI network traffic and it provides a broader examination of the 
entire network. The HIDS is not able to detect these malicious 
intrusions until they breach the system while the NIDS can detect 
the unauthorized intrusion before the attacker reaches the system. 
Therefore, combining the HIDS and NIDS as two lines of defenses 
can create a robust defensive strategy to protect the three main AMI 
components: smart meters, the AMI headend, and the 
communication network. In this work, we propose a DL-based 
approach for both the HIDS and NIDS.  
2.2 Deep learning based intrusion detection 
approach  
Classifying the events in the AMI network into malicious and 
normal events can be approached as binary classification problem 
in which two classes of events are considered: a normal event or 
malicious event. Assigning each event into one of these two classes 
requires a supervised machine learning approach which is trained 
on a labeled dataset. Deep learning (DL) is considered a 
classification algorithm consisting of an input layer, several hidden 
layers, usually more than 3 hidden layers, and an output layer. Each 
layer is composed of several neurons nodes and every node in a 
layer is directly connected to every other node in the next layer 
leading to create a deeper neural network [14]. This architecture is 
used to extract automatically the features from data and make 
predictive classification about new data.  
A typical neuron takes several inputs 𝑥", 𝑥$,… . , 𝑥'	each of which 
is multiplied by a given weight, 𝑤",𝑤$,… . , 𝑤'. These inputs are 
multiplied by their corresponding weights and summed together to 
pass them through a non-linear activation function. The equation of 
a given node is expressed as:  𝑧 = 𝑓(𝑏 + 𝑥 ∗ 𝑤)𝑓(𝑏 + ∑ 𝑤3𝑥3'345 )  (1) 
Where 𝑏 is the bias term which allows to shift the results of the 
activation function to the left or right and to train the model when 
the input features are 0. In this paper, the inputs 𝑥", 𝑥$,… . , 𝑥' are 
the features which represents the each network event in the dataset. 
Example of these features include the network protocol type, the 
flag, the service, the IP address of the sender and the receiver, and 
the Port source and destination. These inputs are fed into an 
activation function. There are three major types of activation 
functions: Sigmoid, Relu function, and Tanh function [4].  
In Sigmoid function, the output is bounded between 0 and 1. When 
the input is very large, the output is close to 1, and when the input 
is very small then the output is close to 0. The values between these 
two extremes are represented as an S-shape. This function is 
expressed as [4]:  𝑓(𝑧) = ""6789   (2) 
 
Where 𝑧 is the input value of a given feature. 
The Relu function which stands for the restricted linear unit (ReLu), 
is a non-linear function expressed as follows [4]:  𝑓(𝑧) = max	(0, 𝑧)    (3) 
Where 𝑧 is the input value of a given feature. 
The Tanh function is similar to the sigmoid function, however 
instead of ranging from 0 to 1, the Tanh’s output ranges from -1 to 
1. The Tanh function is preferred over the sigmoid function since it 
is zero-centered. Tanh function is expressed as [4]:  𝑓(𝑧) = tanh	(0, 𝑧)    (4) 
Where 𝑧 is the input value of a given feature. In this paper, the three 
types of activation functions are considered to train and the test the 
proposed model.  
Training the DL model passes through two majors steps: forward 
propagation and backpropagation. In the forward propagation, the 
training inputs examples are weighted and pass through the 
activation function to compute an output for each node. This output 
is compared against the actual output of the training dataset in order 
to measure the error using the loss function. There is various loss 
function types including the mean square error, mean absolute 
error, mean bias error, and Cross Entropy loss function. Since we 
are dealing with a classification problem, we select the Cross 
Entropy loss function which is expressed as [19]:  𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = −(𝑦3 logO𝑦P3Q + (1 − 𝑦3)log	(1 − 𝑦′3))   (5) 
Where the 𝑦3	is the actual output and 𝑦′3 is the computed one. Once 
the loss function is computed, the backpropagation is performed in 
order to propagate the error to every node in the network and 
reducing the error by updating the weights using a gradient descent 
optimization algorithms. There are several types of optimizers 
including Adaptive moment estimation (Adam), Nesterov 
accelerated gradient, Adagrad, Adadelta, RMSprop [23]. 
According to [23], Adam is the optimal optimizer comparing to 
other gradient descent optimization algorithms. Thus, Adam is 
selected as an optimizer with DL in this paper.   
   
Figure 1. Intrusion detection system architecture for the AMI network 
 
 
Since it is challenging to classify each packet as a normal of an 
attack with 100% confidence, we use the Softmax function in the 
last hidden layer to compute the probability of distribution over a 
set of mutually exclusive labels (0 and 1 in this case). This 
probability provides the level of confidence of the prediction. The 
Softmax function is expressed as:  𝑦3 = 7TU∑ 7TVWVXY    (6) 
Where 𝑍3 is the activation function of a neuron 𝑖 and 𝑘 is the total 
number of hidden neurons. 
2.3 NSL_KDD Dataset Preprocessing  
The dataset used in this paper is the NSL_KDD dataset which is an 
improved version of the KDD cup 99 which was gathered at the 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory [24, 28]. Although the  KDD cup 99 and 
NSL _KDD  includes attacks gathered from a conventional network 
which uses the TCP/IP protocols, it can be used for assessing IDS 
in an industrial network because most of the Smart Grid network 
protocol, including DNP3, IEC 61850, IEC 60870, and Modbus 
uses the TCP/IP protocol. In the NSL_KDD version, several 
improvements have been made including eliminating the redundant 
records and removing the bias from the data distribution [5, 18]. 
The NSL_KDD includes 148 481 records divided into training and 
testing data. Each record represents a network packet and it consists 
of 41 features, 34 are numerical and 7 are symbolic, and an output 
which could be a normal packet or an attack. An attack can belong 
to one of these four attack’s category: Denial of service (DOS), 
Remote to Local (R2L), Remote to Local (R2L), and Probing  [8, 
22]. Table 1 gives a description of each attack’s category and the 
number of records of each category in the dataset. In this paper, we 
put these four attack’s categories as one category named: attack. 
Thus, the dataset has two output either normal or attack packets.   
Table 1. NSL_KDD dataset description 
Record’
s type Description Examples 
Training 
samples 
Testing 
samples 
DOS Denial of service 
Teardrop 
attack and 
Smurf 
attack 
45 927 7 458 
Remote 
to Local 
(R2L) 
Unauthorized 
access from a 
remote 
machine 
Password 
guessing 942 1 656 
User to 
Root 
(U2R) 
Unauthorized 
access to 
local root 
privileges 
from a local 
unprivileged 
user 
Rootkits, 
buffer 
overflow 
attack 
105 1 298 
Probing Surveillance and scanning 
Scanning 
attack 11 656 2 421 
Normal Normal packet 
TCP 
SYN, 
TCP 
ACK 
67 343 9 711 
Before feeding the DL with the training dataset, the NSL_KDD 
dataset has to be preprocessed by transforming and standardizing 
the data in order to help the DL algorithm to converge quickly. Data 
transformation step consists of converting the nominal and 
categorical data into numerical data. Table 2 is used as a model to 
perform a consisting mapping between the nominal symbols and 
the numerical numbers through the entire dataset.  
Table 2. Converting features nominal values into numerical 
ones 
Packet’s field Feature name Numeric values 
Output 
Normal 0 
Attack 1 
Protocol_type 
TCP 2 
UDP 3 
ICMP 4 
Flag 
OTH 5 
REJ 6 
RSTO 7 
RSTR 8 
S0 9 
S1 10 
S2 11 
S3 12 
SF 13 
SH 14 
Service All services 15 to 80 
Standardization consists of centering the data around 0 and scaling 
it with respect to standard variation. The standardization equation 
is expressed as :  𝑥]^_'`_a3b_^3c' = defg  (7) 
Where 𝑥 is the feature’s value, µ and σ are the mean and standard 
deviation of the dataset, respectively.  
3.  Results and discussion  
The proposed DL is implemented using the Tensorflow [1] and 
Keras framework [15] and is trained and tested using the cross-
validation technique with 10 folds. In order to evaluate its 
performance, two metrics are selected: detection accuracy and a 
loss function. The accuracy is expressed as the number of correctly 
classified events over the total number of events. The loss function 
is given by equation (5). Training the DL for the first time requires 
some initial parameters, in this paper, we initiate the number of 
layers to two hidden layers with 300 neuron nodes each and set the 
number of epochs to 3. Simulation results are given in Figures 2 
through 6. 
Figure 2 illustrates the accuracy as a function of the number of 
packets for three different activation functions Relu, Sigmoid, and 
Tanh functions. As it can be seen, DL with Sigmoid and Softmax 
function reports the higher accuracy rate followed by Thanh 
function then the Relu function. The accuracy of the Sigmoid 
function increases slightly as the number of packets increases to 
reaches a peak value of 98,34% with 100 768 packets. Similarly, 
the Tanh function’s accuracy follows almost the same trends by 
increasing slightly as the number of packets increases to reach the 
highest accuracy value of 94,78% with 125 960 packets. Regarding 
the Relu’s accuracy, it increases and decreases randomly with no 
tendency. It higher accuracy value is 97,59% reached with 113 364 
packets. 
 
Figure 2. Accuracy as a function of the number of packets for Sigmoid, 
Tanh, and Relu activation functions 
 
Figure 3. Cross Entropy Loss as a function of the number of packets for 
Sigmoid, Tanh, and Relu activation functions 
Figure 3 depicts the cross entropy loss function as a function of the 
number of packets. As one can see, the Sigmoid with the Softmax 
function reports the lower loss in overall followed by the Tanh with 
function and then Relu function. The loss of Sigmoid and Tanh 
remains almost the same for a different number of packets. With 
Sigmoid, it reaches the lowest value of 0,06 with 62980 packets. 
Tanh’s reaches the lowest accuracy, which is 0,07 with 100 768 
packets. The loss of the Relu function does not show any tendency, 
it decreases and then increases randomly with the lowest value of 
0,8. The results of Figures 2 and 3  suggest that the optimal number 
of packets for training and testing the DL is 125 960. In addition, 
the Sigmoid function is the optimal activation function to improve 
the DL performance in terms of accuracy and error. 
 
Figure 4. Accuracy as a function of the number of epochs for Sigmoid, 
Tanh, and Relu activation functions 
 
Figure 5. Cross Entropy Loss as a function of the number of epochs for 
Sigmoid, Tanh, and Relu activation functions 
Figure 4 shows the accuracy of the three activation functions with 
Softmax as a function of the number of epochs. An epoch means an 
entire pass through the training dataset. It is essential to define the 
optimal number of epochs required for the gradient descent in order 
to converge to an optimum point. As it can be seen, the accuracy of 
the Sigmoid function with the Softmax function increases between 
2 and 10 epochs then it changes slightly between  98% and 99.5% 
before it stabilizes at 80 epochs and reaches the highest accuracy 
values of 99.5% at 100 epochs. Similarly, The Tanh with the 
Softmax function follows the same tendency with lower accuracy 
between 5 and 40 epochs and it outperforms the Sigmoid function 
when the number of epochs is equal to 50 and 70 epochs. The Relu 
with the Softmax function exhibits low accuracy. It increases 
exponentially between 2 and 10 epochs and it stabilizes at 94% 
before increasing to 97% with 71 epochs and then drops to 94% at 
100 epochs. 
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Figure 6. The accuracy of the DL with Sigmoid function as a function of the 
number of layers and the number of hidden nodes. 
Figure 5 illustrates the cross entropy loss as a function of the 
number of epochs for Deep learning with three different activation 
functions: Sigmoid, Relu, and Tanh. As it is expected, the DL with 
Sigmoid function exhibits the lowest error rate followed by Tanh 
and then Relu function. As it can be seen, the Sigmoid function 
changes slightly as the number of epochs increases to reach the 
lowest error value of 0,02 at 100 epochs. Similarly, the Tanh 
function changes slightly as the number of epochs changes. It 
outperforms the Sigmoid function with 50 epochs and it reports the 
same error value at 70 epochs. Its lowest error value is reached with 
90 epochs while the highest one is reached with 30 epochs. The 
Relu function exhibits poor performance in terms of error 
comparing to Sigmoid and Tanh. It decreases to 0,8 with 10 epochs 
and it stabilizes between 10 and 70 epochs and then it drops to 0,34 
with 90 epochs before returning to 0,8 with 100 epochs. The results 
given in Figure 4 and 5 suggest that DL with the Sigmoid activation 
function with 100 epochs exhibit the optimal performance in terms 
of accuracy and error. Thus, we conducted a parametric study in 
order to define the optimal number of nodes and hidden layers to 
improve further the performance of the DL with the Sigmoid 
function in terms of accuracy. The obtained results are given in 
Figure 6. As one can see, the higher the accuracy value, which 
97.1% is produced by 2 hidden layers with 5 neuron nodes each. 
The accuracy decreases to 95.5% with 5 and 10 hidden layers then 
it drops and stagnates at 52.9% with more than 10 layers.   
Table 3 gives the comparison’s results of the proposed DL-based 
approach with three machine learning based IDS approaches 
namely: Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and Naïve 
Bayes. This comparison was conducted on 100 768 packets where 
the cross validation techniques were used to evaluate the 
performance of each approach. For DL, we selected the optimal 
results obtained from the previous experiment by selecting the 
Sigmoid as an activation function with 2 hidden layers and 5 
neurons nodes each. Regarding the other approaches, we conducted 
a parametric study for each approach in order to select the optimal 
parameters’ values which produce the accurate results. Therefore, 
we set the number of trees in the Random Forest to 100, and select 
the Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel for the SVM. As it can be 
seen from Table 3, the proposed approach reports the optimal result 
with a detection accuracy of 95.5%. Random Forest exhibits good 
performances with an accuracy of 99.3% then Naïve Bayes which 
reports 88.9% and finally SVM which shows poor performance 
with an accuracy of  61.7%. 
Table 3. Comparison between the proposed approach with 
Random Forest-based IDS and SVM-based IDS 
Machine learning-based IDS approaches Accuracy 
Proposed DL-based IDS approach 99.5% 
Random Forest-based IDS 99.3% 
SVM-based IDS 61.7% 
Naïve Bayes-based IDS 88.9% 
4. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we developed a Deep learning based Intrusion 
detection system approach for the Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure Network. The proposed classifier is trained and 
tested extensively on the NSL_KDD dataset which includes more 
than 148 480 events, which are classified into normal and attack 
event, and 41 features. An extensive experimental study is 
conducted to define the suitable number of hidden layers, number 
of nodes and the activation function required to classify accurately 
each event. In addition, the proposed approach is compared against 
three machine learning based IDS approach: Random Forest, Naïve 
Bayes, and Support Vector Machine.  The obtained results suggest 
that the proposed DL-based IDS approach with the Sigmoid 
activation function, 2 hidden layers, and 5 neurons nodes each is 
able to classify the packets into normal and malicious with an 
accuracy of 99.5%. The comparison results show that the proposed 
approach outperforms Random Forest, SVM, and Naïve Bayes 
based IDS approach. In addition, we proposed a network security 
architecture to deploy the proposed DL-based IDS at the host and 
the network key location in order to detect the intrusions at all 
levels of the AMI network. As an extension of this work, we will 
set an AMI testbed, simulate some industrial cyber-attacks, and 
then deploy the proposed IDS approach in order to evaluate its 
performance in a real AMI network environment.  
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